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ABSTRACT
College football prospects in the market for an athletic scholarship face similar
career-altering choices as traditional academic students when selecting a college,
however, the market they operate in is very different. They are actively recruited by
university coaches and closely observed by a college sports scouting industry. Their
choice of school is highly anticipated and publicized within college sport culture. College
football is no doubt a lucrative industry, particularly for the elite university football
programs, but one may want to know if the athletic scholars themselves gain in any
career measurable way by attending a more elite university football program. This
analysis uses the scouting and coaches screening information to form a baseline control
for pre-college ability and then estimates the value-added from choosing a more selective
football program by measuring 3 observable football oriented career outcomes: 1) the
probability of receiving an invite to the NFL Combine, 2) an objective metric for strength
and conditioning, and 3) a player's overall order from the NFL draft. Evidence shows that
recruits who choose a more selective university football program have a higher
probability of receiving an invite to the NFL Combine. However, once at the Combine,
there is no evidence that more selective university football programs produce better
athletes based upon standardized strength and conditioning tests. Evidence also suggests
that NFL employers utilize the objective information they gain at the NFL Combine in
their draft decisions, in which case, the premium enjoyed from the initial Combine invite
is attenuated. If NFL teams update the information obtained from the Combine into their
iv

draft decisions, then there is no evidence attending a more selective football program
generates value-added to a recruit’s ability and thus, their post-college career.
Additionally, there is suggestive evidence that highly sought after football recruits are
made worse off by the recruiting process in general, holding objective measures of ability
constant.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Accumulating human capital through a college education is of ever-growing
importance to ensure success and quality of life. Colleges offer programs to help
individuals specialize in a particular set of skills that help them stand out in subsequent
labor markets. Commonly, academic scholarships are awarded to students who show
scholastic promise in the eyes of a university. Since hard-work and student aptitude are
major inputs to a university’s production function, schools compete for academic talent in
a myriad of ways – such as student aid packages, housing amenities, unique customs,
traditions, and other perks, like a quality athletic program. The better the student does, the
better the university looks, which increases their reputation and propensity to garner more
academic talent along with donor contributions.
Athletic scholarships, in particular football scholarships, work in a similar way.
College teams compete for player talent (their primary input) in order to maximize wins
and increase reputation and revenues, thus increasing their propensity to garner better
athletic talent in the future.1 In return, athletic scholars hope to gain practical knowledge
and skills for their prospective career options. When individuals invest a considerable
amount of time and effort into a specialized skill, and perform to a high degree, it reveals

1

See Kesenne (2012) in the Oxford Handbook of Sports Economics for a theoretical model of a college
football team’s objective function and the effect on competitive balance and social welfare. The model can
be used to argue that college football teams engage in a win-maximizing objective, in which case the
distribution of talent across the league is consolidated into the larger market teams causing less competitive
balance and lower overall social welfare. The results are reversed when football teams engage in a leaguewide profit-maximizing objective.
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motivation and intent to pursue careers based on those prior investments. For example,
serious students in the market for academic scholarships likely have a good sense of the
type of professional environment they’d like to pursue and will specialize in particular
qualities to achieve those ends. In a similar fashion, it is reasonable to assume that
college football recruits who have differentiated themselves on a high enough level to be
in the market for a coveted athletic scholarship do indeed have the motivations and
intentions of turning their specialized skills, hard-work, and talents into a professional
athletic career. 2 Such crucial career influencing choices are made by individuals at a
young age (generally between the ages of 17-18 years old) in which the full ramifications
of their decisions may not be clear. If the question of school choice is important on a
cost-benefit basis for the general academic minded student, then it is surely important for
the athletic minded student, as well. 3 Indeed, a considerable amount of economic
research has accumulated in estimating the value-added to labor market returns from
attending elite university programs in the context of the academic scholar. I reintroduce
this economic question through the perspective of the athletic scholar.
The underlying question in this research paper is: Does choosing a more selective
or elite university football program provide any value-added to a player’s measurable
career prospects? An ideal analysis would take identical high school football recruits
and randomly place them into schools with varying quality dimensions and then measure

2

One doesn’t question the motivations and intentions of the violinist who earns a music scholarship to
approach her educational training with the hopes to play professionally. Or the culinary and automotive
tech students looking for placement in their specific industry. Despite different odds of success due to
supply and demand in professional markets, it would be a mistake to assume a high level football recruit
would have a different approach to his human capital accumulation than that of a musician, mathematician,
or other specialized vocational student – just because they are not in a typical job market.
3
Possibly even more so on an individual basis due to the high opportunity costs associated with lucrative
professional sports contracts.
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the difference in outcomes that the labor market also rewards – such as strength and
conditioning, draft position, career opportunities, and earnings. There are two serious
econometric hurdles to address here: First, the double-sided selection bias due to higher
ability players non-randomly selecting onto a more prestigious team, as well as more
prestigious teams non-randomly sorting through recruits to award highly coveted athletic
scholarships (i.e. roster spots) to the higher ability players. If these individual, pre-college
ability characteristics are not accounted for, then estimates on returns to school quality
will be biased upward. Second, potential bias accrues once an individual leaves the
college environment and enters into a highly competitive professional football labor
market in which small differences in each player’s continual training may have
confounding effects on the estimates for college quality.
To address the first concern, I utilize a matching on observables and
unobservables method first presented in Dale and Krueger (2002) in order to circumvent
the double-sided selection bias. This technique observes the set of teams in which a
recruit conveyed interest (i.e. applied to), and which teams either offered (i.e. accepted)
or didn’t offer (i.e. rejected) each prospect an athletic scholarship. The observed results
from the football recruit screening process allows me to utilize the privileged knowledge
that individual market participants have, but would otherwise be unknown in the data.4
The screening data and observed ability variables control for factors correlated with a
football recruit’s school choice and subsequent labor market outcomes. This technique
creates a robust baseline for a recruit’s fixed level of ability post-high-school and precollege when the critical economic decision of school choice is made — allowing for a

4

Hence the term, matching on unobservables.
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natural experiment under the right set of conditions. More methodological details are
discussed later in the paper.
To address the second econometric concern, I narrow the scope of analysis to
measurable outcomes post-college and pre-professional career, effectively isolating
measurable outcomes that may accrue solely through the university football program. For
clean outcome variables, I use NFL Combine results as a standardized post-test score to
measure differences in acquired skills through the university’s often touted strength and
conditioning programs. I also estimate an individual’s probability of being invited to the
NFL Combine, probability of being drafted, as well as their overall draft order – all
conditional on a measure of school quality.
If there is evidence that recruits acquire higher skill sets from higher quality
schools (i.e. value-added), then it would make sense that individuals who attend elite
university football programs systematically receive better draft results and subsequently
earn higher incomes. However, if there is no evidence that elite university football
programs actually cause individuals to acquire greater skills and opportunities, then
football recruits may enjoy greater flexibility in school choice without sacrificing
potential career outcomes.
My thesis is structured in the following order: Section 2 reviews the economic
literature regarding value-added from school choice, and also highlights the limitations
and advantages of mapping this football specific micro-analysis into the econometric
modelling assumptions found in the broader research. Section 3 describes the data and the
environment the players and schools operate in. This section also builds an econometric
model by detailing the theoretical framework, research design, and identification strategy

5
to answer the value-added to school quality question. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results in the context of the college
football labor market.

6

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Circumventing Selection Bias
What are the effects of attending a more selective or elite school on future
earnings and other labor market outcomes? The question is straightforward, but the
empirical path has many potential confounding factors. Of these factors, the primary
concern within the empirical strategy is to circumvent the double-sided selection bias that
occurs when high ability students limit applications to more selective schools and the
more elite schools select and admit students who they perceive to have greater abilities.
It’s well known that this selection process will upwardly bias a desirable outcome
variable, such as career earnings, if there are unobserved higher ability traits within
students who are admitted into elite schools. This is most certainly the case considering
selective schools employ screening panels whose job and livelihood depends on picking
the best and brightest students to admit. In other words, there is an entire market of
economic agents who sort through the supply of students (i.e. a school’s inputs) to find
the potential highest achievers in order to enhance the school’s reputation and prestige.
Although many schools start their selection process using common observable metrics
such as SAT scores, it often does not end there. College admission panels observe
important ability traits through several sources, such as letters of recommendations,
essays, interviews, evidence of community service, etc. – which provides important
privileged information not made readily available for empirical analysis. Indeed, even the
process of applying to a selective institution may reveal important ability characteristics
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about a student in and of itself. Thus, student “unobserved” ability that would otherwise
bias econometric results is often observed in the school selection/admission process. 5
Highly selective schools tend to have substantially higher costs of attendance and
boast that their graduates make higher earnings in the labor market, thus paying the
higher cost off over the medium-to-long run. 6 Indeed, evidence confirms that there is a
large wage gap between those who attend a highly selective academic institution and
those who attend less elite institutions. 7 However, it is an entirely different assertion
whether a highly selective institution actually causes the earnings premium, or whether
the same student would have those same earnings if they attended a less elite institution.
Early researchers investigated the question of increased earnings potential from
attendance at elite universities by using naïve OLS models, confirming a positive and
statistically significant return to attending an elite university (Kane, 1998; Brewer et al.,
1999). However, these models do not address the double-sided selection bias. Several
other empirical strategies have been utilized to correct the value-added estimates for
endogeneity, in which the mixed results have led to a rigorous debate about best practices
and assumptions. Hoekstra (2009) uses a regression discontinuity design to measure the
effect of admissions to a top state university at the admission cutoff of the student
composite high school GPA and SAT score. The study found a 20% increase in earnings
for white-men who later earned wages between the ages of 28 and 33. A well-constructed

5

The caveat is that non-selective schools may not take the time to observe these non-obvious student
characteristics.
6
In the context of college football scholarship athletes, the players don’t necessarily pay out of pocket for
cost of attendance, but they do forgo the value they generate while at the school. This opportunity cost is
estimated to be a sum at least comparable to college debt, and up to $4 million for star athletes (Goff et al.,
2017).
7
See https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/ for published data on cost of attendance, academic records, and
earnings by school. Schools with higher student average SAT scores tend to have graduates with higher
earnings.
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regression discontinuity design will generate effective treatment-control groups for strong
internal validity, however, the method is inherently narrow in scope as it only measures a
very specific subset of the population around an arbitrary cut-off point. In this case,
white-men who were barely admitted into their own state college, suggesting that a more
selective college may improve earnings for the marginal academically inclined whitemale student. It’s less certain that this estimate applies to the general student population.
Long (2007) uses an instrumental variable approach to measure 5 separate proxies for
college quality on 4 different outcome variables and finds that only 3 of the 20
combinations produced statistically significant improvement in outcomes, 8 none of which
were men’s hourly earnings as Hoekstra (2009) suggests. Long (2007) also compared the
instrumental variable approach to the naïve OLS model which only found 12 of the 20
college-quality-outcome combinations to produce statistically significant improvements –
still not a clear cut effect despite the substantial upward bias a model without strong
selection controls is presumed to produce. To say the least, results are mixed on both the
individual proxies used to measure school quality, as well as the overall effects of valueadded to school quality itself.
Some research suggests that the earnings premium exists through a signaling
effect, as opposed to acquired human capital skills, in which an educational institution’s
prestige proxies for the individual’s ability when employers make hiring decisions
(Weiss, 1995; Bills, 2003; Tyler et al., 2000). For example, an employer looking at two

8

The 5 proxies of school quality: median freshman SAT/ACT score, average net tuition, adjusted full
professor salary, professor-student ratio, and an index of college quality. The 4 outcome variables: earned a
bachelor’s degree, men’s hourly earnings, women’s hourly earnings, and self + spouse’s annual earnings.
Significant results were: effect of median freshman SAT/ACT scores on earning a bachelor’s degree, effect
of adjusted full professor salary on women’s log hourly earnings, and the effect of a college quality index
rating on earning a bachelor’s degree.
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very similar job applicants for recent graduates who only vary by their academic
institution’s reputation may be swayed by the institution’s prestige as the marginal factor
in the hiring decision. Mountjoy and Hickman (2020) found evidence of a small earnings
premium for recent graduates of more selective universities, but the earnings premium
fell to zero within 2-3 years of graduation. Presumably, the “elite effect” fades as better
information regarding merit, ability, and other hard to measure soft-skills are eventually
observed and rewarded in the labor market.
One of the most compelling and highly cited studies in this field was delivered by
Dale and Krueger (2002) where they were able to utilize individual level college
admission screening data regarding student university applications and their acceptance
and rejection status by each school, as well as the individual’s college choice from their
set of acceptance options. 9 As described above, they assume that through the
matriculation process many student-ability characteristics that are unobservable to the
econometrician are observed in detail by the college admission screening panels and
subsequently reflected in their acceptance and rejection decisions. Dale and Krueger
(2002) effectively controlled for student unobserved ability by matching them on
identical acceptance and rejection outcomes, as well as commonly observed earnings
covariates such as SAT scores, race, gender, and family background information. The
treatment-control group identification happens when one otherwise identical ‘matchedapplicant’ chooses a more selective school while the other chooses the less selective
school, and the differences in outcomes are measured within each matched-applicant
grouping. They argue that if the student’s decision to attend the less (or more) selective

9

The colleges in their dataset ranged from well-regarded to elite institutions. In other words, they were all
selective, but to varying degrees.
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school is not correlated with the labor market outcome variable and the error terms, then
the method produces the causal impact from attending a more selective college. Their
naïve model without the matched-applicant selection controls found a statistically
significant and economically important 8% earnings premium from attending a more
selective college, where school selectivity is measured by a latent variable for the
institution’s student body average SAT score. When applying the selection controls to
measure earning outcomes within matched-applicant groups, the earnings premium
coefficient falls to near zero, sometimes turning negative, and not statistically significant
(Dale and Krueger, 2002). Dale and Krueger (2014) corroborate these results in their
follow-up paper for the same individuals with a more detailed account of career earnings
using administrative data.
Using the matched-applicant approach with college admissions screening data
was novel and the results controversial as they contradicted much of the literature, as well
as challenging preconceived notions of school quality, reputation, and elitism. After all,
one would expect to get something in return for an additional payment. Mountjoy and
Hickman (2020) also implement the matched-applicant method with the same
identification strategy as Dale and Krueger (2002) using high quality administrative
records for students attending one of thirty public schools in the Texas university system.
They also find that there is no evidence of an earnings premium from attending a more
selective school, holding pre-college ability constant. Furthermore, additional observable
student and school covariates did not alter the earnings premium coefficient beyond what
the pre-college ability fixed-effects had already explained. Mountjoy and Hickman
(2020) were also able to utilize their rich dataset to alleviate concerns regarding potential
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threats to the identification process, namely showing that once students are matched
within applicant groups, they did not further sort into colleges based on their own ability.
Since the major appeal of the matched-applicant approach is to circumvent the doublesided selection bias due to non-random sorting, their evidence extends the econometric
method by reinforcing both its internal and external validity.
2.2 Defining School Quality
Even if the endogeneity issues are effectively controlled, a second major concern
within the literature is defining adequate measures of school “quality” that highly
selective colleges purport to have. As Black and Smith (2006) point out, “school
selectivity” and “school quality” are used synonymously as measurement devices for
explanatory variables and caution that the two are similar, but not identical. The primary
metric for school selectivity is a school’s student body average SAT score since it
identifies which schools have higher acceptance standards. A higher school average SAT
score indicates an overall higher achieving student who themselves are more selective,
and thus the presumption of a higher quality of education – why would high achievers
settle for less? Other common measures of school quality include average teacher pay,
expenditures per student, and student-teacher ratio. These other proxies translate into
higher input costs that serve to improve school quality and thus create/attract higher
ability students (i.e. the ones with higher average SAT scores). In a way, school
selectivity is an earned outcome from input expenditures that promote the quality of
human capital accumulation, and hence school selectivity is considered a latent variable
for school quality. I will use the latent variable approach of school selectivity, as opposed
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to school expenditure categories, because it allows for individual schools to decide their
own resource allocation process in order to generate a quality football program.
Black and Smith (2006) suggest that using the latent variable approach to estimate
school quality, such as the school’s average SAT score, has the benefits of simplicity and
ease of interpretation, but lacks the important multidimensionality of quality between
schools and the heterogeneous effects between student types. For example, some colleges
excel (or lack) in particular programs that produce different levels of career earnings (e.g.
engineering vs humanities or business vs art), and not letting the quality metric vary on
multiple dimensions loses true explanatory power. This is a real concern when
measuring returns with a latent variable for a diverse set of degree seeking students. For
example, a large investment in the school of arts may or may not improve the quality of
education for the average student, and likely have very little measurable effect on
students in the nursing program. In short, the more heterogeneous the population of
interest, the less effective the “catch-all” latent variable approach to estimate returns to
school quality will be. This concern is not able to be addressed within the data from Dale
and Krueger (2002, 2014), as well as many other studies in this field. However, if the
population of interest is fairly homogenous, as is the case in this football-economy
microanalysis, then using a latent variable to estimate school quality is quite
advantageous. It allows schools to determine how quality is produced by not limiting the
effects of any value-added to the explicit variables chosen by (or limited to) the
researcher. The basis of the homogeneity argument is that every economic agent in the
dataset are playing the same game, under the same set of rules, and maneuvering through
the same process governed by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). An
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additional assumption I’ll make here is that the objective of the football recruits are also
similar, in that every football player on an athletic scholarship has the intention to pursue
a professional career in football. The amount of work and personal investment to earn a
football scholarship suggests a motivation and intention to pursue it as a professional
prospect. Although the odds of gaining entry into the professional football labor market
will differ substantially between players, any given player would not turn down the
opportunity for something else.
A university football program’s production function is also relatively lowdimensional. In the absence of league-wide profit sharing, universities face a winmaximizing objective function that relies primarily on the accumulation of top player
talent (Kesenne, 2006). 10 Since player compensation is capped at a scholarship across
the board, regardless of talent, school-by-school differences in direct cost for player talent
are trivial. University football programs also face the same capacity constraints of 85
football scholarships for any given roster year. 11 The important takeaway regarding the
homogeneity assumption and non-random sorting is that the incentive for athletes to sort
into schools to generate heterogeneous monetary opportunities from their name, image,
and likeness is severely punished by threat of expulsion from the university and thus,
their career track. Notice that the athletic scholar’s path through the college football
training program is well defined and enforced; however, the university itself faces
relatively fewer NCAA regulations on how it chooses to spend its resources. Once

10

Profits are shared within football conferences, but to varying degrees. This does not create an incentive to
maximize profits across the FBS subdivision.
11
However, the obvious economic response to both quantity and price controls for compensation to athletes
is that schools use amenities as indirect (and less efficient) incentives to compete for talent – often with
high fixed and sunk cost expenditures. The incentives have been described as an ‘arms race’ that have
larger ramifications to the university and public as a whole. See Leadley et al. (2015) for a detailed
description of the incentives structures that arise in intercollegiate sports.
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controlling for a recruits pre-college level of ability, the variation in outcomes will fall
within the variation in the university’s resource allocation decisions that drive school
quality. Thus, the strict NCAA bylaws and enforcement mechanism creates a highly
advantageous situation for a researcher in search of a treatment and control group.
Much of the school selectivity research uses individual SAT scores or other
standardized aptitude tests as controls for pre-college ability which may take away
important ‘between’ variation of specialized knowledge when students differ on many
dimensions, such as college majors. For example, Black and Smith (2006) use the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) as their composite aptitude
measurement. The components of this exam measures general academic knowledge in
basic science and math, as well as additional comprehensions in subjects regarding
mechanics, automotive information, and electronics knowledge. These ASVAB
components measure very specific ability traits not necessarily important to many
particular career paths (e.g. accounting or political science). OLS regressions of different
student types along these standardized metrics means that people are being “matched” on
erroneous composite measures which can lead to measurement error – possibly
explaining some of the literatures mixed results. In this more narrow football labor
market, college football prospects are associated with a standardized recruiting score that
is analogous to an overall aptitude score, but along the dimensions of football related
ability alone. This standardized metric makes measuring variations between individuals
and outcomes more relevant and robust for inference. The standardized recruiting score
will be further discussed in the next section as it happens to be a key metric in the valueadded estimating equation.
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After considering the key elements of the school quality research, the subsequent
analysis will benefit from a fairly homogenous group of economic actors, low
dimensionality in economic variables, and a highly controlled labor market structure.
Importantly, rich datasets and fair assumptions do not create a natural experiment with a
source of random assignment needed for causal inference. The typical research design
without a random component to control for selection bias must assume that the observed
characteristics, however accurate they may be, are similar and run in the same direction
as unobservable characteristics.
2.3 Intangible Characteristics of Athletes
In the context of this research, it could be the case that some players have less
than ideal observable characteristics and actively make up for it with highly prized
intangibles. Conversely, some players may look so good on paper that they don’t need to
acquire certain intangible skills. It’s important to consider that football is a highly
competitive team sport in which success goes beyond individual skills and depends in
part on team cohesion. To this end, the field of Sport Psychology provides evidence that
emotional intelligence (EI) is a contributing factor to athletic performance (Laborde et al.,
2016). The field further provides evidence that EI has even stronger correlations on
performance outcomes in team sports, as opposed to individual, non-team sports
(Crombie et al., 2009; Castro-Sánchez et al., 2018). These innate ability attributes that do
not appear in the college football recruiting datasets may include communication skills,
leadership, empathy, motivation, athletic IQ, intuition, and moxie. 12 Laborde et al. (2016)
finds EI relates to emotions, physiological stress responses, successful psychological skill

12

Moxie is a term often used when describing athletes who may have less than ideal observable
characteristics but display a sense of grit, drive, and determination to win.
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usage, and more successful athletic performance. The authors find evidence that EI
operates on several levels, specifically comprehension of athletic knowledge, the
accumulation of athletic ability, and formation of valuable athletic characteristic traits
such as leadership and communication skills. Castro-Sánchez et al. (2018) explore
multiple dimensions of EI and finds that ego-centric traits are positively predictive of
individual sport performance, but are negatively related in environments where teamcohesion is important. This suggests that an emotional capacity for oneself as well as
empathy for others is a trait that will be rewarded in the football labor market.
These soft skills, personality traits, and other intangible ability characteristics that
encompass emotional intelligence are not easily measured and likely correlate differently
between individuals, positions, and their observable characteristics. However difficult to
measure, these EI traits are sought after in the recruiting process. If coaching staffs
observe these characteristics, then they will be reflective in the university’s screening
decisions. The next sections details the economic landscape in which our agents operate
and the theoretical framework designed to control for unobserved ability, as well as the
identification strategy to capture the as-if random assignment in the college football
matriculation process.
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CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Economic Environment and Matriculation Process
There are roughly 900 college level football programs in the United States, where
nearly ¾ of the teams are under NCAA authority. 13 Depending on the year, the NCAA
sponsors about 250 Division-I football programs, over 170 Division-II, and nearly 250 in
Division-III. This analysis will only observe individuals from Division-I football
programs since they operate with a completely separate set of guidelines, rules, resources,
and constraints than Division-II and Division-III schools. Furthermore, the 250 Division-I
schools are split into two separate subdivision— teams in the Football Bowl Subdivision
(FBS) and teams in the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS). These subdivisions
are effectively 2 different leagues when it comes to selectivity, school quality, resources,
and recruitment rules, and as such, I limit the subsequent analysis to the institutions that
comprise the FBS. 14 The dataset consists of 13 years of college football recruiting cohorts
between 2003 and 2015 for a yearly average of 116 FBS teams. Within the FBS, there are
10 football conferences as well as a few conference independent teams. It is common
practice to refer to the top 5 elite conferences as the Power 5 and the less elite FBS
conferences as the Group of 5. FBS football programs can have up to 85 scholarship
players on their roster any given year. However, a maximum of 25 scholarships can be

13

This includes NCAA Division I, II, and III schools. There exist a small non-NCAA sanctioned league,
and about 120 2-year junior college teams not under direct NCAA authority.
14
I also exclude military academies (Air Force, Army, and Navy) since they have separate recruiting
guidelines. Furthermore, military cadets are not able to participate in professional sports until their service
obligations are fulfilled.
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awarded each year for any given team’s incoming recruiting cohort. This constraint
creates a highly competitive market for talent.
FBS football teams allocate a considerable amount of time, effort, and money into
recruiting athletes. 15 University coaches and their assistants visit potential recruits to see
them play in high school games. They may also do in-home visits and meet their families
and high-school coaches. Schools often host football camps which potential recruits are
invited to attend. Schools can even cover travel expenses to host a campus visit for up to
5 prospects per year. Additionally, any recruit can visit a school and meet with the
athletic staff at their own expense. However, the timeframe in which coaches can
communicate with recruits is tightly controlled. Contact and evaluation periods can
happen freely in 4 months of the year, with restricted contact periods spanning another 4
months, and strictly forbidden contact periods the remaining 4 months. These time
constraints necessitate a prioritization process that promotes selectivity on behalf of the
recruiter and recruit.
The school admission screening data is available online by football recruiting
outlets such as Rivals.com and 247sports.com. The private recruiting companies track
potential FBS football prospects who are in the market for athletic scholarships. The
recruiting agencies log the football programs each player is interested in, which of those
interested schools extend scholarship offers, along with which schools who do not extend
an offer, and ultimately the school the recruit chose to attend. Additionally, these private

15
In the 2013-14 season the average FBS school spent over $700,000 on men’s athletics recruiting
expenses, ranging from $96,000 to $2,096,000 (U.S. Department of Education, 2020). The data comes from
the U.S. Department of Education’s Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act which only separates recruiting
expenses by gender, but the lion’s share of men’s sports recruiting expenses is allocated to football and
basketball. The stated figures do not incorporate coach salaries that in large part reward recruiting efforts,
or other budget allocations such as marketing that also promote recruiting.
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companies employ their own set of scouts to accumulate as much information on FBS
recruits as possible. 16 Private scouts are active year-round and agglomerate specialized
recruiting knowledge similar to coaching staffs. They primarily review live game footage
in detail and some recruiting outlets even hold football camps. They contact recruits in a
variety of ways to log additional information such as position, height, weight, hometown,
and high school attended. Prospective recruits volunteer detailed information as they use
the scouting platforms to market themselves to football programs. Every scouting agency
uses their specialized market knowledge to establish overall recruiting scores in which
players are rated, categorized, and ranked by ability relative to each other. In particular,
247sports.com publishes a composite recruiting score that equally weights the top
scouting agency’s individually determined recruiting scores. This standardized recruiting
score encapsulates the specialized knowledge of an entire industry’s measure of a
recruit’s overall pre-college football ability.
If a player chooses to accept a scholarship offer from a school, then they agree to
the terms and conditions of NCAA eligibility as a student-athlete. 17 The student-athlete
plays football for the school in the capacity the school wishes (they may play every game
or zero games), while maintaining minimum behavioral and academic achievement
standards. In turn, the student-athlete may attend college without paying the explicit cost
of tuition.

16

Private scouting agencies are not bound by any NCAA constraints and compete for information in a
lucrative and expanding business model revolving around high school sports.
17
Student-athlete is a legal term that was initially created to prevent football players from claiming
employee status which would in turn allow them to collect workman compensation benefits in the case of a
football related injury. The legal term was very successful and further evolved to give the NCAA exclusive
rights over the student-athlete’s name, image, and likeness (Leadley et al., 2015). Any personal profiteering
on the student-athlete’s part (e.g. signing an autograph for monetary gain, favor, or in-kind gift of any sort)
can result in disqualification from the league and termination of scholarship.
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3.2 Research Design and Identification Strategy
The university coaching staff’s job is to observe the objective and subjective
ability characteristics of recruiting prospects discussed above. Since accumulating talent
is paramount to success for the university’s football program and coaches wish to
maximize wins in order to secure their jobs, the coaching staff’s incentive structure is
based around accurately gauging and attracting talented recruits. Additionally, the
athletes themselves have knowledge about their own ability and how well their talents
may project into the competitive football labor market. Both players and coaches have
scarce resources and will attempt to optimize their own prospects. For example, coaches
from mid-level schools want the best athletes, but they don’t want to waste their
resources recruiting top athletes who are likely to choose a more selective school.
Athletes generally want to go to the top programs and get as much exposure as possible,
but the top programs select the top athletes based on overall ability. Recruits must also
limit their application process to the universities where they will be competitive in based
on the knowledge of their own abilities and aptitudes. Matriculation happens once
recruits and coaches have assessed the competitive landscape and determined their best
fit. The university will either offer (i.e. accept) or not-offer (i.e. reject) an athletic
scholarship to the interested recruit based on their ability characteristics. Recruits may
receive multiple offers, or none at all from a wide array of teams of different quality.
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Equation (1) models the football program’s decision to offer a prospective recruit
a scholarship. 18 The school’s decision variable, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , to offer a recruit an athletic
scholarship can be modelled as

𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 > 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾1 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗

(1)

where school j offers player i if: 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 .

The variable 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 represents a player’s observable characteristics evaluated in the recruiting

process known to both the recruiter at school j and the econometrician, while 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 represents

the unobservable characteristics not known to the econometrician, but observed by school
j’s recruiting staff. For example, highly regarded academic institutions who participate in
FBS football (e.g. Stanford, Northwestern, Duke, Vanderbilt, and Rice) will likely put
more relative weight on the characteristic of academic ability than the average institution.
Since minimum thresholds of academic eligibility exist and grades are not observed in the
recruiting data, then this information falls into 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 . If, however, academic ability is not

rewarded in the NFL labor market, then controlling for it is a moot point. 19 The school’s

decision thresholds 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 and 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 represents each school’s lower and upper cutoff
threshold, respectively, which determines whether the school offers a prospective recruit

an athletic scholarship. All gamma coefficients in equation (1) are added up to calculate a
decision variable 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 to offer or not-offer a scholarship to the recruit based on the school
j’s perceived cutoff that maximizes their objective function and subject to their own set of

18

This model is nearly identical to the matriculation decision used by Dale and Krueger (2002). It is only
modified to include an upper cutoff threshold (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 ) to describe the situation in which a less endowed
team would not find it rational to recruit and offer player “out of their league”.
19
This is an arguable consideration. The NFL accepts individuals without degrees, as well as those who
went to Junior College due to academic restrictions. However, invitations to the NFL Combine and draft
are rewarded conditional on NCAA eligibility rules which means those particular outcome variables are
most likely dependent in part on academic ability.
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constraints. An important assumption is that 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in equation (1) is not correlated with any
outcome variable, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 , and is assumed independent across teams.

The last step of the matriculation process occurs when the athlete examines their

set of offers and commits to a school of a particular quality based upon their own
objective function. Dumond et al. (2008) models a college football recruit’s commitment
decision and finds certain school characteristics that are predictive of their school choice.
Their model suggests that recruits are more likely to choose a school that has a large
stadium and updated facilities, is a successful bowl eligible Power 5 team, has good (but
not too good) academic ratings, offers an official campus visit, and has higher media
exposure – which are general characteristics of more selective schools. That said,
Dumond et al. (2008) found that the commanding source of variation in their model for a
football recruit’s school choice was a negative relationship with distance from their
hometown. This makes sense on two levels: one) a player is more likely to be a fan of a
team closer to their hometown, and two) the demanding schedule of being a full-time
student and a full-time college football player leaves little room for wage earning
opportunities that won’t violate NCAA rules. Thus, being closer to home for any type of
support, financial or otherwise, is likely an important consideration.
The following model estimates the value-added from attending a higher quality
football program using a latent variable of school selectivity:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∗ + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 represents a professional career related outcome such as an NFL Combine

(2)

invite, strength and conditioning metrics, or draft results. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽1

which represents the value-added from attending a more selective football program –
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measured by the latent variable 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∗ which is the school average recruiting score for the

incoming recruiting cohort of school j. The term 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 captures pre-college player

observables that influence earnings. The term 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 is the otherwise unobserved ability
characteristics in the absence of scouting and university screening information.

Estimating the naïve model without 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 will upwardly bias the value-added

coefficient on 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∗ . Even if 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 is properly measured and defined in the model, 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∗ will

still be biased upwards if higher ability players never applied to less selective schools to
begin with, or less selective schools didn’t even attempt to recruit them. To this point,
Dale and Krueger (1999) run several simulations and show that a variable to control for
unobserved ability alone will not fully correct the double sided selection bias. Ultimately,
a source of random assignment into a treatment group for school quality is needed for a
causal interpretation.
To explore possible sources of random variation that might place recruits into
treatment and control groups, consider the simple latent variable model for a recruit’s
commitment decision:
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 = 𝒒𝒒𝒋𝒋 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3)

where 𝒒𝒒𝒋𝒋 is a vector of school quality characteristics (discussed above) that generates a

process for football programs to be more selective in their scholarship offers. Individual
recruits will examine each school’s set of 𝒒𝒒𝒋𝒋 characteristics and commit to the offering

team that maximizes their future prospects. The random disturbance term 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents

factors that influence the commit decision but are necessarily uncorrelated with any

outcome variable. As previously stated, Dumond et al. (2008) found the distance between
a recruit’s hometown and offering school accounts for the majority of variation in the
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school choice model. Since a recruit’s hometown is unlikely to be correlated with labor
market outcomes, then proximity to a school is a likely source of random variation to
identify treatment into a particular school type defined by the latent variable 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 .

Furthermore, Dumond et al. (2008) finds that their highly specified model only accounts
for 63% of the variation in school choice, leaving a considerable amount of additional
random factors to potentially identify subjects into treatment and control groups. The key
assumption regarding these random factors that determine treatment groups is that they
are not correlated with any outcome variable, yet determines, in part, which school a
player chooses.
In the following empirical analysis I estimate equation (2) in two ways. In the first
method I use the scouting industry’s composite recruiting score described above 20 as a

measure of 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 and run a regression with other pre-college observable covariates, 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 . The

results will indicate that this is a good control for overall ability, but the model still lacks a
source of random assignment for reliable estimates. In the second method I implement the
matched-applicant model by generating a set of dummy variables that match individuals
on nearly identical levels of pre-college ability. To achieve this baseline, I parse each
individual into narrowly defined ability groups based on their own composite recruiting
score. From there, individuals within each narrowly defined ability group are further parsed
into subgroups based on a narrow range of the average school selectivity score from their
top 5 offers. 21 Table 1 provides an illustration and a more detailed description of how the

20
This is the recruit’s average ability score determined by the leading college football scouting companies
in the industry. Largely based on personal observations, viewing game video, communication with recruits,
and observations made in mini-camps, among other sources of information.
21
This matching technique utilizes two measures of ability, one from the private scouting industry and one
from each coaching staff’s screening panels. Even though both likely capture much of the same ability
measures, the composite recruiting score is more likely to pick up on raw and technical athletic ability,
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matched-applicant groups were constructed. This second method can be expressed by a
slight modification of equation (2),
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∗ + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(4)

where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents a set of matched-applicant dummy variables assigning each

individual to a fixed effect, pre-college ability group. The fixed effect dummies provide a
baseline in order to estimate the value-added coefficient, 𝛽𝛽1 , within groups of nearly

identical ability characteristics. The natural expectation is that each athlete will commit to
the highest quality team from which they received an offer. Although this happens in
many cases, some athletes within matched groups choose a less selective team for reasons
unrelated to ability and outcomes. This is the random variation the matched-applicant
model seeks to exploit. If the error terms in equations (1) and (3) are uncorrelated with
the outcome variable, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 , in equation (4), then a natural experiment arises due to the

otherwise random assignment into a university’s football program and 𝛽𝛽1 can be

interpreted as the causal effect of school selectivity on the player’s professional career
outcome.
Since this natural experiment depends on treatment into a particular school type,
all players who transferred schools in their college career are excluded from the analysis.
Even though transferring schools is not typical due to the barriers set in the NCAA
regulations that restrict player mobility, it is still a necessary option for some players,
most commonly in transition to and from a junior college due to academic or behavioral
issues. With these exclusions, the sample data may not exactly capture the average

while the measure from coaches (who actually offer the scholarships) likely have more intimate knowledge
of factors such as emotional intelligence and academic ability due to a more personal communication
channel, as well as having the additional incentives to acquire such knowledge.
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Table 1

Illustration of Matched-Applicant Groups Used in Logit Models

Match
Group

Recruit
Score

Top 5 Offers
Team-average

Group
Count

Position

1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5

88.0
87.8
87.5
88.2
88.1
83.54
81.85
81.74
83.33
81.85
83.33
82.94
95.5
95.3
96.0
95.6
85.12
85.06
84.83
95.3
95.6

82.8
82.6
82.9
82.9
82.5
79.54
79.75
78.65
79.79
78.82
79.13
79.96
88.1
87.9
89.0
88.2
88.98
87.67
87.60
90.9
91.4

5
5
5
5
5
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2

DB
LB
DL
OL
WR
WR
TE
DB
OL
LB
LB
DB
DL
OL
OL
OL
RB
LB
DL
DL
WR

School
School Choice Selectivity
Score
TCU
84.6
California
85.9
Stanford
90.5
Kansas
85.5
Virginia Tech
86.2
Iowa State
81.22
NC State
84.44
Cincinnati
83.99
Alabama
85.48
SMU
78.55
Boston College
82.53
Buffalo
77.75
Georgia
90.4
LSU
91.3
Notre Dame
93.0
Florida State
92.5
South Florida
82.99
Texas A&M
89.21
Southern Miss
79.63
Michigan
90.4
Texas
91.4

Year
2013
2008
2012
2008
2008
2006
2014
2012
2004
2014
2004
2014
2010
2014
2008
2015
2013
2013
2013
2009
2011

Notes: Each row of this table shows a hypothetical player is first parsed into groups based on a narrow range of their
own recruit score, and then matched into groups by a narrow range of the team-average recruit score from their top 5
offers. Specifically, recruits were coarsened into 30 similar groupings based on a 1 point parsing (0.16 of a standard
deviation) of their own composite recruiting score. From there, recruits within these 30 initial groupings were further
matched into very similar parsing of the team-average recruit score of their top 5 offers. The average spread in recruit
score within matched groups is 1.47 (or 0.23 of a standard deviation) and the average spread in team-average recruit
score of their top 5 offers with matched groups is 1.47 (or 0.34 of a standard deviation). This generated a total of 247
matched dummy sets over the 21,251 recruits in the sample. The median number of observations within each matched
group is 238, with an average of 283, a standard deviation of 207, and a range between 1 and 812. All regressions
using the matched-applicant dummies use frequency weights to account for the variation in group size. The dummy
groups illustrated here are only used in the logit regressions and are not position specific.

football recruit, but it does capture the typical football recruit – or the one for which the
NCAA system was designed. 22 The following empirical section uses both the composite
recruiting score and the matched-applicant method to control for unobserved ability in
order to estimate the value-added from attending a more selective college football

22

A major reason to transfer between schools is for academic eligibility concerns, so excluding these
transfers further increases the homogeneity of college football players in this analysis. In other words, the
sample data only includes individuals who maintain NCAA academic eligibility standards above the
minimum threshold throughout their college career.
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program on 1) probability of receiving an NFL Combine invite, 2) the probability of
being drafted into the NFL, 3) objective measures of strength and conditioning, and 4)
overall pick in the NFL draft.
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Probability of Receiving an NFL Combine Invite
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the full sample of FBS college football
recruits who committed to a team between 2003 and 2015. The restricted sample
provides a subset of summary statistics for the set of observations who meet
identification criteria for the matched-applicant model. There are two reasons for the
difference in sample sizes – one being methodological and one being empirical. First,
some players did not match on the coarsening parameters and fell into an ability group by
themselves. Since the natural experiment depends on variation of school choice within
matched groups, non-matches are dropped from the matched-applicant model. Second,
the likelihood function from the logit regression can only converge when there is
variation in outcomes within matched groups. Matched groups that did not have any
within variation of outcomes were also dropped from the matched-applicant logit model.
The two samples differ by 556 observations and the summary statistics remain
qualitatively similar.
Each year the NFL extends Combine invites to about 320 draft eligible football
players who have officially exhausted their NCAA eligibility. 23 After the Combine, the
32 NFL teams officially draft 256 players into the league each year. The order in which
they are drafted primarily determines their rookie contract and pay-scale; players picked

23

NCAA eligibility is typically 4 years. There are circumstances in which players may be granted extended
eligibility. Players can choose to prematurely terminate their NCAA eligibility to gain NFL Combine and
draft consideration as long as they are at least 3 years removed from high school.
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Table 2

Summary Statistics: College Football Recruits 2003-2015
Mean

Outcomes
Combine invite
Drafted
Invite or drafted
School Quality
Team-average recruit
score
Ability and Screening
Panel Covariates
Own recruit score
Top 5 offers teamaverage
Offers received
Rejection-rate
Official visits
BMI in HS
Height in HS (inches)
Weight in HS (lbs.)
Chose in-state school
Ivy interest

Full Sample
Std.
Min
Dev.

Max

Restricted Sample
Std.
Mean
Min
Dev.

Max

0.123
0.094
0.132

0.33
0.29
0.40

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.126
0.096
0.135

0.33
0.29
0.34

0
0
0

1
1
1

81.99

4.75

70.0

96.4

82.11

4.68

70

96.4

82.17

6.30

70

100

82.29

6.29

70

100

81.62

4.40

70.9

93.6

81.74

4.32

70.9

93.6

4.68
0.31
0.80
28.42
74.03
222.70
0.42
0.04

4.90
0.30
0.91
4.42
2.55
43.0
0.49
0.29

1
0
0
18.2
61
139
0
0

53
1
6
46.3
82
410
1
7

4.74
0.31
0.81
28.42
74.04
222.77
0.42
0.04

4.91
0.30
0.91
4.42
2.55
43.02
0.49
0.29

1
0
0
18.2
61
140
0
0

53
0.94
6
46.3
82
410
1
7

N
21,251
20,695
Notes: The sample includes FBS athletic scholarship recipients for incoming recruiting cohorts
between years 2003-2015 who did not attend multiple schools. Outcomes include NFL Combine and
draft years up until the year 2020. The restricted sample excludes recruits who did not match on the
defined parameters or were included in the 61 dummy groups that were dropped due to insufficient
variation in outcomes within groups required for a logit regression.

sooner get paid more than players picked later. Not everyone who receives a Combine
invite gets drafted, and not everyone who gets drafted attended the Combine. However,
nearly every official Combine invite is eventually signed as an undrafted free agent if
they are not officially drafted. Thus, the Combine invite alone is a “foot in the door” with
a high likelihood of some sort of payout, if not a contract for at least the league minimum
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wage. 24 The simple mean of the sample indicates that 12.3% of FBS scholarship recruits
get an NFL Combine invite.
Table 3 presents the average marginal effects of value-added from school quality
on the probability of receiving an NFL Combine invite using a logit regression. The
marginal effects are computed for each individual and then averaged across the sample.
Column 1 is a simple logit regression on the school selectivity score (team-average
recruit score) from the football program each individual chose to attend. The simple
model predicts the average marginal effect from attending a school with a 1 point
increase in selectivity score will increase the probability of an invite by 1.92%, averaged
across all individuals in the sample. This accounts for 15.6% (1.92/12.3) of the overall
sample predicted probability of an invite. Column 2 is still a naïve model since it only
accounts for basic observable characteristics of a football recruit. Here, it includes their
body mass index in high school (bmiHS), 25 if they chose an in-state school (in-state), the
number of schools that extended an official visit (visits), if they had interest in an Ivy
League school (Ivy interest), as well as fixed effect controls for their position, home state,
and recruiting year cohort. The average marginal effect from a 1 point increase in school
selectivity decreases slightly to 1.8%, but is qualitatively similar to model 1. Column 3
adds the composite recruiting score (recruit score) which is a convenient measure for
overall ability characteristics found in both 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 in equation (2) above. After pulling
unaccounted measures of innate ability from the error term, the value-added coefficient

24
The NFL Players Association’s collective bargaining agreement stipulates a rookie minimum salary at
$375,000 in 2011 and increased to $510,000 by 2020 (NFLPA, 2011). Prior to the 2011 collective
bargaining agreement, draftees were able to separately negotiate initial rookie contracts. This analysis does
not quantitatively measure salary as an outcome, but simply uses the overall draft pick as an ordinal
measure for outcomes. In other words, draft order is a qualitative measure of initial salary.
25
Along with its square term (bmiHS2) and an interaction on position (bmiHS*pos).
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on team-average recruit score drops by 2/3 compared to the estimate in model 1 and
remains statistically significant. The average marginal effect from attending a more
selective school increases the probability of an invite by only 0.70%, which now accounts
for only 5.7% of the overall predicted probability of receiving an invite.
Column 4 adds college admission screening controls to the estimation,
specifically the number of scholarship offers received (offers), a square term for the
number of offers (offers2), the average team selectivity score from the top 5 offers the
recruit received (top 5 offers team-average), and the recruit’s rejection rate (rejection
rate). 26 These ability measures provided through the admissions screening process
continue to decrease the value-added coefficient on school quality. The results in column
4 indicate that the average player has a 12.3% chance of getting an NFL Combine invite,
but only 0.64% of that probability is attributed to attending a more selective school. The
reduction of the coefficient on team-average recruit score is in line with the general
notion that unaccounted ability will bias the value-added estimates upward. However,
using the players own recruiting score to control for pre-college football ability does not
account for any non-random sorting by both players and schools.
Equations 5 – 7 in Table 3 implement the matched-applicant method to estimate
the returns to school quality outlined in equation (4) above. The model in column 5 runs a
logit regression on the player’s school selectivity score with no additional control
variables other than 185 dummy variable groupings for pre-college ability fixed effects
and a case for a natural experiment within those groups. The results show an average
marginal effect from a 1 point increase in school selectivity will increase the probability

26

Rejection rate is defined as the number of non-offers relative to the number of schools the recruit
expressed interest in.
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Table 3
Selection
control

Average Marginal Effects for Probability of NFL Combine Invite
None

Recruit score

1
Teamaverage
recruit score

2
***

3
***

0.0192
(0.000871)

0.0180
(0.000827)

Recruit
score

Matched-applicants
4

***

5
***

0.00703
(0.000974)

0.00639
(0.00110)

0.0110***
(0.000589)

0.00978***
(0.000725)

6
***

0.00642
(0.00116)

7
***

0.00645
(0.00105)

0.00637***
(0.00104)
0.00712**
(0.00311)

bmiHS

-0.0297***
(0.00855)

-0.0352***
(0.00778)

-0.0358***
(0.00782)

-0.0474***
(0.00777)

-0.0473***
(0.00773)

bmiHS2

0.000359***
(0.000116)

0.000400***
(0.000107)

0.000411***
(0.000107)

0.000556***
(0.000114)

0.000554***
(0.000114)

bmiHS*pos

0.000442
(0.000297)

0.000531*
(0.000281)

0.000542*
(0.000281)

0.000863***
(0.000279)

0.000868***
(0.000278)

Visits

0.0240***
(0.00259)

0.0135***
(0.00249)

0.0110***
(0.00241)

0.00673***
(0.00241)

0.00666***
(0.00240)

In-state

0.0125**
(0.00532)

0.00349
(0.00511)

0.00546
(0.00519)

0.00758
(0.00508)

0.00724
(0.00508)

Ivy interest

-0.0167*
(0.00998)

-0.00874
(0.00858)

-0.00745
(0.00808)

-0.00792
(0.00782)

-0.00782
(0.00787)

Offers

0.00187
(0.00130)

0.00519***
(0.00146)

0.00487***
(0.00148)

Offers2

-0.0000255
(0.0000367)

-0.000120**
(0.0000517)

-0.000110**
(0.0000518)

Rejection
rate

-0.0340***
(0.00995)

-0.0116
(0.0112)

-0.0128
(0.0113)

Top 5 offers
teamaverage

0.000962
(0.00133)

-0.00897*
(0.00483)

-0.00930*
(0.00482)

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

Year FE
Position FE
State FE

x

x
x
x

x
x
x

0.123***
0.123***
0.123***
0.123***
0.0905***
0.0905***
0.0905***
(0.00395)
(0.00356)
(0.00339)
(0.00335)
(0.00340)
(0.00297)
(0.00297)
N
21,251
21,251
21,251
21,251
20,695
20,695
20,695
Standard errors in parentheses. Data from recruiting cohorts 2003 - 2015 and NFL Combine years up to 2020. Marginal
effects are computed for each individual and then averaged across the sample. Predictions computed at sample means.
Fixed effects include year, player's home state, and position where indicated. There were a total of 247 successfully
matched dummy sets, while only 185 of the matched sets met the identification strategy, thus restricting the sample size
by 556 observations. Frequency weights were applied to regressions using matched-applicant method to account for the
wide range of observations within each matched set. Standard errors clustered at the team level.
Prediction

*

p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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of receiving an NFL Combine invite by 0.64%. This reduced the value-added coefficient
by 2/3 when compared to the estimates in column 1 and remains statistically significant at
the 1% level. The estimate is nearly identical to the highly specified model in column 4.
When adding additional recruit characteristics and screening controls in columns 6 and 7,
the value-added estimates from school quality remain robust regardless of the
specifications. Column 7 highlights the robustness of the matched-applicant estimates by
adding the player’s own recruit score, which was just shown to have a major effect on the
value-added from school quality as well as other covariates in the model. Since the
matched dummies already control for observed and unobserved ability, the recruit score
variable does little to affect overall results, yet remains statistically significant at the 5%
level. This indicates that both measures of pre-college ability are capturing similar
variation, but the matched-applicant method is much more robust to model specification
which suggests that there is a source of random variation assigning treatment.
The results in Table 3 are computed using the average prediction across all
individuals in the sample. However, there are different marginal effects in the predictive
probability of receiving an NFL Combine invite at various levels of school quality.
Figure 1 plots the average marginal effects from the model in column 1 and column 7 at
various team-average recruiting scores. The information college coaching staffs are likely
pitching to prospective recruiting talent is shown in Model 1, the value-added without
selection controls, while Model 7 controls for baseline ability under the conditions of a
natural experiment. The evidence shows that the most elite football programs can
overstate their value-added to a player’s labor market outcomes by up to 4 times their
actual value once holding predetermined ability constant. Although both models are
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Figure 1

Average Marginal Effects of School Quality on Combine Invite

Figure 2

Overall Probability of Combine Invite
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increasing, the 95% confidence interval widens with increases in school quality which
suggests that any marginal gains from attending a more elite school is more tenuous than
the average school in the sample.
To make things more concrete, consider the average player in the sample with a
recruit score of 82 who is deciding whether to attend the average school in the sample
(𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∗ = 82) or a school that is 1 standard deviation above the average (𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∗ = 87). Figure 2
also uses the regression results from Table 3 to show the overall predictive probabilities
at various school quality levels. Using the estimates in Model 1, the probability of
receiving a Combine invite is 22% when attending the above average school and only
9.54% for the same player at the average school. According to Model 1, attending the
above average school more than doubles the odds of a Combine invite compared to the
average school – which would be a hard thing for a recruit to pass up. However, the
selection corrected value-added estimates from Model 7 predicts attending a school that
is 1 standard deviation above average is associated with a 12.5% overall probability of an
invite, while the average school predicts an invite probability of 8.73%. Conditional on
the recruit’s pre-college ability, the additional gains of moving from one school type to
the next is relatively small, however, it is a statistically significant gain nonetheless.
There are several other observations between the two methods worth noting. First,
there is a sign reversal on the coefficient for the average selectivity score of the recruit’s
top 5 offers. This ability measure is observed in the college admissions screening process
which more directly emphasizes the value coach’s place on a recruit and the caliber of the
typical football program that was actively recruiting them. The higher the score on the
top 5 offers, the more recruitment from more elite university coaching staffs. Although
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it’s only marginally significant at the 10% level, the negative sign is counter-intuitive and
continues to show up in the subsequent analysis. Second, the overall average probability
of receiving an invite falls from 12.3% in the models without selection controls to 9% in
the matched- applicant models. Keep in mind that the average player receiving an invite
to the NFL Combine is well above average in ability from the overall sample and
typically attends a more selective football program. 27 It would make sense that the ‘true’
predicted probability of the model is actually lower for the average recruit than the simple
mean in the sample suggests. The matched dummies are effectively weighting the overall
predicted results by ability. Third, the overall prediction for the matched-applicant
models have lower standard errors despite the loss in degrees of freedom when adding
185 additional dummy variables to the regression. To compare goodness of fit, the
matched-applicant model in column 7 classifies 91.1% of the sample correctly while the
similar model in column 4 correctly classifies 88.5% of the sample. Although not too
dissimilar in estimating coefficients, the additional inference checks and signs of
robustness indicate greater efficacy for the matched-applicant model. That said, the
recruiting score as a single measure for pre-college baseline ability does some serious
heavy lifting on its own.
4.2 Probability of Being Drafted Into the NFL
Table 4 presents the value-added from school quality on the probability of being
drafted into the NFL using the same covariates used to estimate columns 1, 4, and 5 of
Table 3. The trend is similar to the previous Combine invite results in that the controls for
baseline player ability attenuate the effect of school quality on labor market outcomes.

27

See Table 5 summary statistics
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One noticeable difference is that the average marginal effects are even smaller than the
Combine invite results. The matched-applicant estimates for school quality are just ¼ the
size of the estimates without selection controls. This suggests that NFL employers are
more likely to extend a Combine invite to a player from a more selective school, but
relatively less likely to draft a player from a more selective school. It is helpful to
acknowledge that the NFL is likely aware of the market distortions that may occur when
pulling an entire labor supply from a monopsony market, and hence the reason to host the
Combine in the first place – to sort out the lemons from the cherries in order to avoid a
potential draft bust. The next set of empirical results explore what kind of information is
accumulated by NFL employers once the job applicants participate in the NFL Combine.

Table 4

Average Marginal Effects for Probability of Being Drafted into NFL

Selection control
Team-average
recruit score

None
1
0.0147***
(0.000685)

Matched-applicant
3
0.00382***
(0.00104)

0.00791***
(0.000625)

Recruit score

Year FE
Position FE
State FE

Recruit score
2
0.00480***
(0.00106)

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

0.0941***
0.0941***
0.0699***
(0.00302)
(0.00258)
(0.00250)
N
21,251
21,251
20,843
Notes: This table presents the average marginal effects on being drafted into the NFL give a 1 point
increase in team-average recruit score. Columns 1, 2, and 3 are estimated using the same covariates as
columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 3, respectively, except year, position, and state fixed effects were included
in all models to make for better comparisons. Marginal effects are computed for each individual and then
averaged across the sample. Predictions computed at sample means. There were a total of 247
successfully matched dummy sets, while only 182 of the matched sets met the identification strategy,
thus restricting the sample size by 408 observations. Frequency weights were applied to regressions
using matched-applicant method to account for the wide range of observations within each matched set.
Data from recruiting cohorts 2003 - 2015 and NFL draft years up to 2020. Standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the team level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Prediction
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4.3 Strength and Conditioning Evidence Using NFL Combine Results
The NFL Combine is a weeklong athletic skills showcase that takes place each
year one month before the draft. The 32 NFL club teams collectively fund the event and
invite about 320 draft eligible players in order to get a better look at the talent entering
the professional landscape. A variety of standardized skills tests are administered in a
heavily controlled environment each year. 28 Any given test is voluntary and players
occasionally opt out of particular tests for a variety of reasons. However, there are 3
recorded metrics that nearly every Combine participant logs at the event: height, weight,
and 40 yard dash time. These 3 metrics on their own don’t seem like much, especially
since every position has a different ideal distribution of each of these 3 random
variables. 29 When combined in a particular way, they can form a measure sometime
referred to as explosive power, speed-strength, or horizontal-force. For the purposes of
this analysis, I simply refer to the measure as force since the calculation is derived from
Newton’s Laws of Physics: 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. A variable for a player’s

body mass index (BMI) is derived from their height and weight measured at the NFL
Combine. Technically acceleration is a rate of change at a specific moment in time,

however, I am able to calculate an average acceleration measurement given the 40 yard
dash time. The metric used in the following estimations multiplies each individuals BMI
by their average acceleration to form an outcome measure of force. Table 5 provides the

28
The location of the NFL Combine for all cohorts in the sample was Indianapolis’s Lucas Oil Stadium,
which is a dome able to replicate identical environmental settings between each cohort.
29
Receivers are tall and lean, running backs are short and stalky, while linemen are big and bulky. Taken
separately, height, weight, and speed characteristics will have confounding differential effects between
positions.
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means and standard deviations for all inputs to force, as well as the other NFL Combine
related variables in the models.
Table 5

Summary Statistics: FBS Recruits Participating in the NFL Combine
Mean

Full Sample
Std. Dev.
Min

Max

Mean

Restricted Sample
Std. Dev.
Min

Max

Combine variables
Force
40 yard dash time
Average acceleration

50.19
4.77
1.63

4.230
0.304
0.195

29.9
4.2
1.0

66.1
6.0
2.1

50.23
4.76
1.63

4.174
0.303
0.194

29.9
4.2
1.0

66.1
6.0
2.1

BMI at Combine
Height at Combine

31.25
73.8

4.406
2.657

21.6
65

44.7
82

31.23
73.8

4.391
2.662

21.6
65

44.5
82

Weight at Combine
School Quality
Team-average recruit
score
Ability and Screening
Panel Covariates
Own recruit score
Top 5 offers teamaverage
Offers received
Rejection-rate
Official visits
BMI in HS
Height in HS (inches)
Weight in HS (lbs.)
Chose in state school
Ivy interest

243.4

44.846

160

369

243.3

44.811

160

369

85.56

4.594

71.7

96.4

85.62

4.562

71.7

96.4

87.68

7.174

70

100

87.82

7.098

70

100

84.98

4.396

71.7

93.2

85.05

4.357

71.7

93.2

7.47
0.21
1.20
28.19
74.3
222.6
0.46
0.025

6.511
0.255
1.147
4.463
2.554
43.408
0.498
0.237

1
0
0
18.8
66
141
0
0

49
1
5
46.3
82
370
1
5

7.58
0.21
1.21
28.17
74.3
222.4
0.46
0.025

6.509
0.252
1.149
4.448
2.559
43.334
0.499
0.239

1
0
0
18.8
66
141
0
0

49
1
5
46.3
82
370
1
5

N
2,470
2,402
Notes: This table presents the subsample of FBS athletic scholarship recipients who were invited to the
NFL Combine and have an official record for height, weight, and 40 yard dash time. The restricted
sample excludes 68 observations who did not match on the defined parameters.

Figure 3 provides a visual inspection of how force is correlated with the players’
ultimate goal – getting drafted at the lowest pick possible. There is a clear association that
exists no matter the position; increasing ones force is strongly correlated with a better
draft outcome. This is intuitive for a high impact sport such as football and it’s reasonable
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to assume college programs will teach to this standardized test. 30 FBS universities
expend large allocations to their athletic training facilities and staff, and the quality of a
team’s strength and conditioning program is a key feature in the recruiting pitch to the
prospective college recruit. Since speed-strength, measured by force, is a well-known
characteristic the labor market rewards, it is reasonable for a recruit to believe that an
elite football program will produce this purely objective metric at a premium.

Figure 3

30

Effects of Force on Overall NFL Draft Order

It’s instructive to note that one can increase their force in two ways: 1) increasing their body mass, and 2)
increasing their acceleration. This allows every position to adopt a strength and conditioning routine that
can target the same outcome metric in a heterogeneous way. Large lineman may want to focus on building
body mass, while wide receivers may want to focus on speed. More of both is even better as it would
compound to greater explosive power. However, there is a tradeoff in that the larger the mass the lower the
acceleration, and vice-versa. A player will benefit from strength and conditioning training that helps them
optimize this tradeoff.
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Table 6 provides OLS estimates for the value-added from school quality on force.
The regression in column 1 estimates a model without a control for selection bias or
baseline levels of ability. It shows that more selective schools produce players with
greater explosive power. Column 1 indicates that choosing a school with a 1 standard
deviation higher team-average recruit score will increase force by 9% of a standard
deviation. This may not seem like much, but football is a ‘game of inches’ and any
competitive edge is highly rewarded.
After adding the player’s own recruit score and other pre-college characteristics
to the regression, the value-added coefficient on team-average recruit score turns
negative and is not statistically different from zero. Column 3 shows that initial highschool measures of BMI increases force at a decreasing rate – confirming the tradeoff
athletes make when building speed-strength. When height and weight enter the equation
separately, we see that height is associated with an increase in force and weight is
associated with a decrease, holding high-school BMI constant. This indicates a premium
on the speed side of the equation since increasing weight slows a body down and
increasing height typically comes with longer legs and thus an advantage in running. An
interaction on high-school BMI and position shows that there is no significant difference
in the marginal effect on force between position and different body types. This suggests
that the intensity of the measure of force is equally important for all positions, and all
types of players are able to produce force to their particular strength and conditioning
needs.
Column 4 estimates the value-added from school quality with additional screening
controls. The team-average recruit score coefficient turns back positive, but is still less
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than a ¼ of the size from column 1 and not statistically different form zero. The change
in sign on team-average recruit score only happens when allowing a measure for the
average recruiting score of the player's top 5 offers to enter the equation. The coefficient
on top 5 offers team-average is negative, statistically significant, and economically
important. This implies that the players recruited from more elite universities perform
worse on strength and conditioning tests – holding their raw-ability recruit score and
college quality constant. It could be that high profile players feel that they don’t need to
work as hard to hit the standardized marks the NFL is looking for. It could also be the
case that coaches are placing a high value on certain intangible skills unrelated to
physical strength and conditioning training that are not being factored in by the private
scouting industry. It’s also entirely possible that all the highly recruited players
agglomerate into a select few teams and receive relatively less individual coaching
attention regarding strength and conditioning. However, one would expect the sign on the
total number of scholarship offers to run in the same direction as top 5 offers teamaverage since they are both indicators of a more highly recruited player.
If the natural experiment described above truly captures a source of random
variation, and pre-college ability fixed effects can be held constant within groups, then
the matched-applicant method should be able to produce robust estimates for a school’s
value-added on force. The matched dummies in this model were constructed with an
extra layer to match on that was not present in the logit model from the previous section.
The difference is that all observations are first matched into position groups. From there,
each player within their position group is parsed into subgroups by a narrow range of
their recruiting score. Within these position-recruit-score groups, players are even further
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Table 6
Selection
control

OLS Estimates on Strength and Conditioning Measure of Force
None

Matched-applicants

2
-0.0207
(0.0221)

3
-0.0160
(0.0208)

4
0.0171
(0.0214)

0.0388***
(0.0116)

0.0283**
(0.0120)

0.0512***
(0.0157)

bmiHS

3.439***
(0.443)

3.440***
(0.445)

3.439***
(0.512)

3.456***
(0.517)

bmiHS2

-0.0175***
(0.00318)

-0.0178***
(0.00321)

-0.0205***
(0.00377)

-0.0206***
(0.00378)

bmiHS*pos

-0.0000857
(0.00767)

-0.000243
(0.00775)

-0.000344
(0.000977)

-0.000350
(0.000974)

heightHS

1.045***
(0.280)

1.040***
(0.280)

0.939***
(0.310)

0.950***
(0.314)

weightHS

-0.270***
(0.0497)

-0.267***
(0.0498)

-0.237***
(0.0534)

-0.238***
(0.0540)

Visits

0.00638
(0.0581)

0.0311
(0.0563)

0.0830
(0.0670)

0.0776
(0.0680)

In state

0.211
(0.138)

0.220
(0.139)

0.272*
(0.157)

0.264*
(0.156)

Ivy interest

0.0904
(0.242)

0.0703
(0.238)

0.0872
(0.282)

0.0967
(0.280)

Offers

0.00693
(0.0399)

-0.0430
(0.0442)

-0.0440
(0.0436)

Offers2

-0.000451
(0.000996)

0.000806
(0.00106)

0.000823
(0.00105)

Rejection Rate

-0.129
(0.330)

-0.0644
(0.389)

-0.0476
(0.390)

Top 5 offers
team-average

-0.0837***
(0.0309)

-0.0399
(0.108)

-0.0491
(0.108)

x
x
x

x
x
within

x
x
within

Team-average
recruit score

1
0.0820***
(0.0220)

Recruit score

Recruit score

Year FE
State FE
Position FE

x

x
x
x

x
x
x

5
0.0235
(0.0262)

6
0.0232
(0.0247)

7
0.0214
(0.0250)
0.0843
(0.0696)

within

43.28***
47.87***
-52.11**
-49.95**
47.97***
-46.03*
-52.04*
(1.942)
(1.459)
(21.07)
(21.19)
(2.669)
(25.77)
(27.00)
N
2,470
2,470
2,470
2,470
2,402
2,402
2,402
adj. R2
0.012
0.410
0.487
0.488
0.321
0.453
0.454
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Data from FBS recruiting cohorts 2003 - 2015 and NFL Combine years up to
2020. Force = Body Mass x Acceleration. FE include year cohort and the player's home state where indicated.
Position is held constant within the matched-applicant groups. That is, every dummy category is matched on the same
position and very similar recruiting score measuring pre-college ability and are further matched on very similar
scholarship offers measured by average school selectivity of the recruit's top five offers. Standard errors clustered at
team level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Constant
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parsed and matched by the team-average selectivity score of their top 5 scholarship
offers. 31 After dropping 68 observations who did not match, there are 248 dummy
variables for pre-college ability fixed effects, each holding position constant within
groups. Table 7 provides an illustration of how these dummy groups were constructed.
It’s worth pointing out that simply being invited to the NFL Combine puts the sample
into a more narrow ability range to begin with.
Columns 5-7 in Table 6 implement the matched-applicant method with robust
results for all coefficients in the model regardless of specification. The value-added
coefficient on school quality remains low and not statistically different from zero. It is
again worth pointing out the counter-intuitive negative signs on top 5 offers teamaverage, as well as the total number of offers. One would expect these recruitment
measurements to run in the same direction since they both come directly from the
university coaching staff’s assessment of a higher quality player, but one would not
expect the sign to remain negative across specification and models. At best, they are not
statistically different from zero. Even though the matched dummies already control for
baseline ability, adding the player’s own recruit score highlights the robustness in the
matched-applicant model, as shown in column 7. Most of the covariation happens
between the players’ ability measures and the constant term which houses the pre-college
ability fixed effects from the matched dummies. This is further evidence that the
assignment of variation within the model is well specified – presumably due to a random
factor identifying treatment. In short, there is no evidence that elite schools produce

31

The parsing of recruiting score within each matched group have an average spread of 2.6 recruiting
points, or 0.36 of a standard deviation. The parsing of average recruiting score of the top 5 offers within
each matched group have an average spread of 2.1 points, or 0.48 of a standard deviation.
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football players with higher levels of strength and conditioning once controlling for precollege player characteristics.
Table 7

Illustration of Matched-Applicant Groups (Position Held Constant)

School
Selectivity
Year
Score
1
84.17
82.48
5
WR
Kentucky
81.29
2008
1
84.62
84.97
5
WR
Stanford
87.83
2011
1
85.56
84.15
5
WR
Michigan State
83.75
2008
1
84.97
83.09
5
WR
Houston
82.6
2013
1
85.76
82.88
5
WR
USF
78.5
2006
2
83.33
78.52
6
LB
Nevada
75.24
2005
2
80.62
78.12
6
LB
Utah State
78.12
2012
2
82.19
79.58
6
LB
Boston College
80.98
2013
2
83.33
78.93
6
LB
Wake Forest
76.58
2004
2
81.11
79.13
6
LB
N. C State
82.15
2006
2
81.11
77.99
6
LB
Iowa State
82.28
2009
3
98.17
87.81
3
QB
LSU
89.84
2003
3
97.40
86.53
3
QB
Washington
82.83
2006
3
98.06
86.93
3
QB
Missouri
85.82
2008
4
99.24
88.25
2
QB
Michigan
90.09
2004
4
99.27
89.63
2
QB
Penn State
86.2
2013
Notes: Each row of this table shows a hypothetical player is first matched into groups by position. They are
then parsed into groups based on a narrow range of their own recruit score, and then matched into groups by
a narrow range of the team-average recruit score from their top 5 offers. Specifically, recruits were split by
nine different position groupings. From there, they were parsed into dummy groups by their recruit score
with an average spread of 2.57 points (or 0.36 of a standard deviation) within groups. These groups were
further matched on team-average recruit score of their top 5 offers with an average spread within the group
of 2.11 points (or 0.48 of a standard deviation). This generated a total of 316 matched dummy sets over the
2,470 recruits in the sample.
Match
Group

Recruit
Score

Top 5 Offers
Team-average

Group
Count

Position

School Choice

4.4 Career Placement Using NFL Draft Results
Is there a career placement premium from attending a more elite football program
once NFL employers have assessed the pool of job applicants at the NFL Combine?
Recall from section 4.2 that there is evidence more selective football programs provide
additional value-added in the probability of being drafted into the NFL, albeit seemingly
small. One can assume that the high cost of putting on the NFL Combine is an attempt to
avoid draft busts by gaining additional information at the individual level. The following
section estimates the value-added from school quality on NFL draft order. Table 8
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presents summary statistics for the subsample of FBS recruits who were selected into the
NFL draft up until the year 2020. I constructed 303 matched-applicant dummies which
holds position constant within groups in the same way described in section 4.3. 32
Table 9 displays the OLS regression results for the value-added equation on overall draft
order.33 A basic model without controls for pre-college ability or selection bias show a
statistically significant improvement in draft order from attending a more elite football
program. The results from the naïve regression in column 1 state that a 1 standard
deviation increase in school selectivity is associated with a 12.5 spot improvement in
draft position. For context, using the 2011 rookie pay scale, a mid-3rd round
improvement of 12 spots increases the rookie contract value by about $280,000. Column
2 adds the player’s recruit score to the model and the value-added coefficient on school
quality decreases by over 80% and is not statistically different from zero. The regression
in column 2 states that a 1 standard deviation increase in a player’s own recruit score
improves their overall draft order by 16 spots, on average. Column 3 shows that precollege physical characteristics such as high school BMI no longer enter the model with
statistical significance as they did in the regressions from the previous sections. This is
evidence that NFL employers have been updated on new information at the Combine and
the older information is no longer correlated with outcomes. By not explicitly controlling
for the updated information that happened during a player’s college tenure, it allows the
latent variable for school quality (i.e. team-average recruit score) to pick up any potential

32

The parsing of recruiting score within each matched group have an average spread of 2.45 recruiting
points, or 0.34 of a standard deviation. The parsing of average recruiting score of the top 5 offers within
each matched group have an average spread of 1.75 points, or 0.4 of a standard deviation.
33
The lower the number the better the outcome; 1st pick overall being the most rewarded and 256 being the
least.
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value-added attributed to the school’s football program. However, the regressions in
columns 2 and 3 do not provide evidence of any labor market returns attributed to
attending a more selective football program.
Table 8

Summary Statistics: FBS Recruits in NFL Draft
Full Sample
Std.
Min
Dev.

N

Mean

Draft and
Combine variables
Overall pick

2,000

118.69

73.73

Force

1,711

50.90

BMI at Combine

1,805

40 yard dash time
Average
acceleration
Height at Combine
Weight at Combine

Restricted Sample
Std.
Mean
Min
Dev.

Max

N

Max

1

256

1,905

118.67

73.60

1

256

3.99

35.7

66.1

1,633

50.96

3.93

35.7

66.1

31.37

4.35

22.6

44.7

1,723

31.36

4.33

22.6

44.5

1,711

4.74

0.30

4.2

5.9

1,633

4.74

0.30

4.2

5.9

1,711

1.64

0.20

1.1

2.1

1,633

1.65

0.20

1.1

2.1

1,805

73.92

2.64

65

81

1,723

73.90

2.65

65

81

1,805

245.17

44.57

166

358

1,723

244.97

44.57

166

358

2,000

85.59

4.68

71.7

96.4

1,905

85.71

4.62

71.7

96.4

2,000

87.75

7.18

70

100

1,905

87.97

7.08

70

100

2,000

85.03

4.44

71.7

93.2

1,905

85.13

4.37

71.7

93.2

2,000

28.18

4.38

18.8

46.3

1,905

28.18

4.38

18.8

46.3

2,000

74.35

2.56

66

82

1,905

74.34

2.57

66

82

School Quality
Team-average
recruit score
Ability and
Screening Panel
Covariates
Own recruit score
Top 5 offers teamaverage
BMI in HS
height in HS
(inches)
weight in HS (lbs.)

2,000

222.69

42.76

141

361

1,905

222.63

42.85

141

361

Offers received

2,000

7.78

6.81

1

49

1,905

7.95

6.84

1

49

Rejection-rate

2,000

0.21

0.25

0

1

1,905

0.21

0.25

0

1

Official visits

2,000

1.23

1.17

0

5

1,905

1.24

1.18

0

5

2,000

0.46

0.50

0

1

1,905

0.46

0.50

0

1

2,000

0.03

0.25

0

5

1,905

0.03

0.25

0

5

Chose in state
school
Ivy interest

Notes: Table includes recruiting cohorts between 2003 and 2015 and draft year outcomes up until 2020.
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Table 9
Selection
control
Team-average
recruit score

OLS Estimates on Overall Draft Pick
None
1
-2.681***
(0.370

Recruit score

Recruit score
2
-0.128
(0.568)

3
0.00801
(0.686)

-2.265***
(0.360)

-2.315***
(0.444)

Matched-applicants
4
-1.658**
(0.836)

5
-1.548*
(0.848)

6
-1.492*
(0.841)

7
-0.664
(0.781)

-4.781**
(1.925)

-4.083**
(1.907)

bmiHS

4.384
(6.005)

2.849
(6.715)

3.797
(6.638)

11.59
(7.110)

bmiHS2

-0.0874
(0.0908)

-0.0499
(0.100)

-0.0595
(0.0997)

-0.137
(0.108)

bmiHS*pos

0.168
(0.256)

-0.00339
(0.319)

-0.0404
(0.313)

-0.191
(0.311)

Visits

-0.991
(1.581)

-2.005
(1.774)

-1.854
(1.763)

-2.287
(1.776)

In state

-3.288
(3.358)

-4.109
(3.263)

-3.944
(3.270)

-3.855
(3.556)

Ivy interest

1.877
(5.556)

5.818
(4.358)

5.600
(4.439)

4.943
(3.597)

Offers

2.299***
(0.690)

2.700***
(0.839)

2.545***
(0.847)

1.935**
(0.905)

Offers2

-0.0385**
(0.0191)

-0.0498**
(0.0234)

-0.0472**
(0.0232)

-0.0252
(0.0251)

Rejection Rate

9.273
(6.364)

16.32*
(8.526)

14.00
(8.782)

1.731
(8.663)

Top 5 offers
team-average

-1.088
(0.960)

0.933
(3.181)

1.360
(3.222)

1.356
(3.400)
-5.625***
(0.595)

Force
State FE
Position FE

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
within

x
within

x
within

x
within

303.3***
288.5***
319.1***
335.0***
218.4
508.1*
497.2
(95.75)
(94.73)
(98.97)
(69.27)
(274.0)
(294.7)
(308.9)
N
2000
2000
2000
1,905
1,905
1,905
1,633
adj. R2
0.047
0.068
0.069
0.157
0.166
0.170
0.205
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Data from recruiting cohorts 2003 - 2015 and draft years up to 2020. All
models include FE for player home state and position. Position is held constant within the matched-applicant groups.
That is, every dummy category is matched on the same position for a similar recruiting score measuring pre-college
ability and are further parsed into groups with similar scholarship offers measured by average school selectivity of
the recruit's top five offers. Year FE were dropped from the draft pick model due to a lack of significance given a
standard F-test. Position FE were marginally significant and often failed a standard F-test once excluding the
position for Kicker. However, given the strong intuition to control for position and maintaining consistency between
models and methods, position FE were left in the estimating equation. Standard errors clustered at team level.
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Constant
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Columns 4 – 7 implement the matched-applicant model using 303 groupings of
pre-college ability fixed effects while holding position constant within groups. The model
in column 4 only uses the ability dummies and state level fixed effects. The coefficient on
team-average recruit score is nearly 60% the size from column 1 and statistically
significant at the 5% level. The estimates decrease slightly in magnitude as more precollege individual characteristics enter the model, but become marginally significant at
the 10% level. Interpreting the school quality coefficient in column 6 suggests the
premium from attending a more selective football program is a 7 spot draft improvement
given a 1 standard deviation in team-average recruit score. The value-added effect is not
immaterial considering the large average payout draft order is associated with, however,
it is marginally insignificant at conventional levels and warrants a cautious interpretation.
Given the results in Section 4.3, we know that NFL employers have updated
information through a standardized college exit exam that is the NFL Combine –
particularly along the strength and conditioning measure of force. Additionally, we found
strong evidence that this measure was not correlated with variations in school quality and
is driven by one’s own pre-college individual ability characteristics; thus, it is not
appropriate to let the force variable remain in the error term and be absorbed by the latent
variable for college quality. Column 7 allows force to enter the model, and in turn, the
value-added to attending an elite football university decreases to ¼ of the size from
column 1 and is not distinguishable from zero. Both force and recruit score remain
statistically significant and economically important.
If NFL employers are not incorporating the objective information they learn at the
Combine, then it is likely the case that attending an elite football program can generate
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some marginal gains in the NFL draft, as indicated in columns 4 – 6 of Table 9. If NFL
teams do utilize the Combine information, then there is no evidence of value-added from
school quality as indicated by draft outcomes. That being said, this evidence was
conditional on receiving a Combine invite to begin with, which was shown in Section 4.1
to have a causal impact, albeit small, through school selectivity. In other words, even if
NFL employers are able to objectively sort out the talent through the Combine and utilize
the information in the draft, there may still be a positive effect on career outcomes
attributed to school selectivity if selection into the Combine is due to market distortions
created by university football programs.
4.5 Evidence of Market Distortions
Lastly, Table 9 shows a statistically significant and robust counterintuitive sign on
the coefficient for number of scholarship offers received during the recruiting process.
This does not appear to be a one-off specification error since the sign on both the number
of offers and top 5 offers team-average have been working in the opposite direction of
positive outcomes throughout the analysis. This suggests that high school players who are
more heavily recruited by university coaches are associated with worse draft results,
holding school quality and raw-ability measures constant. The results in column 7 imply
that a highly sought after recruit who receives an additional 7 scholarship offers (i.e. a 1
standard deviation increase) can expect to fall in the draft by 13 spots. It’s worth
speculating on these coach’s assessment variables from the admission screening data
since the effect is robust and highly significant across the draft specifications, as well as
having some corroborating evidence of a similar pattern in Table 3 (see columns 6 and 7)
and Table 6 (see columns 4, 6, and 7).
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It could be the case that the extra recruiting attention these individuals receive are
ego inducing, which Castro-Sánchez et al. (2018) have shown to detract from athletic
performance in a team setting. That said, the R-squared for emotional intelligence is not
particularly high in the determination of overall athletic performance and it would be
surprising for the single dimension of ego to emerge as such a strong effect. It could also
be the case that the increase in offers were awarded because of valuable intangible skills,
such as emotional intelligence, observed by the university recruiting staff despite lower
physical ability traits. However, it is likely the case that NFL programs would also
reward those same intangibles, so the compensating intangible skills theory seems to be
an unlikely explanation for the counter-intuitive effects associated with offers and top 5
offers team-average. A more likely (and economic) explanation considers the incentive
structure of the recruiting process. If highly sought after recruits are agglomerating into
more selective programs, and those programs have a fixed capacity in which to put their
talent to use, then elite teams can essentially hoard the more valuable players. Since there
are indeed a fixed number of games, positions, players on the field, and years of NCAA
eligibility, it is likely the case that the more highly prized talent are – literally – sitting on
the sidelines rather than putting their resources to best use. If elite university football
coaches are selling high-school recruits on the idea that playing for their program is in
their best interest for reasons causal of their program’s quality, then the evidence above
suggests that such a marketing ploy is a disingenuous claim. The commanding share of
labor market outcomes are attributed to pre-college ability a recruit brings to the football
program to begin with.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The evidence here indicates that college football recruits receive limited valueadded from attending a more selective football university. The results come in 3 parts.
First, the average football recruit who chooses a more selective football university enjoys
a small increase in the probability of receiving an invitation to the NFL Combine. It is not
clear on how much the small marginal increase in probability translates to in the labor
market, or if the effect is nothing more than a short-lived signal once labor market
experience comes into play. Second, there are no measurable premiums from attending a
more elite football university on the strength and conditioning measure of force. More
selective schools are not turning out faster and stronger athletes above and beyond what
less selective schools would have done, once controlling for the athlete’s baseline skill
level. Football is an incredibly physical job and the data show that physical force is
statistically and economically important in the recruit’s career prospects – arguably the
most important considering the NFL pays a steep price just to assess at the Combine.
Third, results from Table 9 show that if NFL employers fully factor in the objective skills
tests they observe at the Combine, then there is no value-added to draft outcomes from
attending an elite football university. However, NFL employers are not purely objective
decision makers. Massey and Thaler (2013) provide statistical evidence that NFL teams
consistently over-value top draft prospects relative to the player’s later observed
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professional performance outcomes. 34 Given this, it is unlikely that NFL teams are
looking at a purely objective world described by column 7 in Table 9, despite having a
multi-million dollar incentive to do so. It’s more likely the case they are looking at the
signal of school quality described by column 5 or 6 in Table 9, or something in between.
If players from elite football institutions systematically end up going earlier in the draft
due in part to school quality signals as opposed to objective performance measures, then
they will likely end up being overvalued on the field. If this is the case, then it is a
reasonable explanation to the results in Massey and Thaler (2013).
The evidence presented here also indicates a negative effect specifically for
highly recruited players, holding ability and school quality constant. This suggests that
there is something in the institutional design of the college football recruiting process that
is making highly sought after players worse off. In particular, the NCAA’s winmaximizing incentive structure (as opposed to the NFL’s maximizing league-wide profits
incentive structure) described in Fort and Quirk (2004) and Kesenne (2006) theorizes that
the larger market college football programs will indeed hoard talent because it is
financially in their interest. It isn’t unreasonable that any team would want to do that,
however, it is unreasonable that the NCAA punishes their student-athletes when they
attempt to move to a team that will better utilize their hard earned talents. Sutter and
Winkler (2003) provide evidence that the more elite football universities tend to vote for
more restrictive price and quantity controls, such as capping the number of scholarships
and limiting compensation, because it reduces competitive balance for smaller market
teams. Restricting players from transferring schools keeps other schools from gaining

34

The researcher’s advice is that NFL teams should more readily trade away their early picks for later ones
because they are likely to end up with an over-valued player.
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talent and becoming more competitive. Furthermore, this restraint of trade lowers overall
welfare in the market, not just for athletes, but also the spectators, universities, and
communities that the athletic departments are financially tied in with. Several economists
have elaborated on the negative externalities created by the NCAA cartel structure
(Becker, 1987; Eckard, 1998; Kahn, 2007; Humphreys and Ruseski, 2018), and several
other authors have expanded on the “arms race” for athletic talent that exist within the
university system (Grant et al., 2014; Clotfelter, 2011). The overarching economic issue
is that the price mechanism is not allowed to work in the college athlete’s favor, so
universities precariously expend resources to indirectly woo athletic talent – typically on
sunk and high fixed cost expenditures. Universities that are hindered from competing for
talent due to restraints on trade can’t compete for wins and revenues, and thus unable to
spend at the levels to attract top recruits. If athletes believe their future success is related
to university athletic spending, then they are more likely to see their set of options as
more limiting to the fewer amount of schools who can afford to signal an elite status.
However, the evidence presented here suggests that the objective labor market
characteristics the NFL is looking to employ is not deterministic on school status and
heavily recruited players may benefit from not choosing the more selective school. The
idea that more heavily recruited athletes are made worse off, holding talent constant, may
be a symptom of the NCAA cartel structure.
Lastly, it should be made clear that the literature and evidence discussed above in
no way suggests that academic or athletic education is unimportant, however, the
evidence merely suggests that a more elite university does not systematically produce
human capital gains at a higher level than a less elite institution. This research adds to the
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body of evidence that it is indeed important to have put oneself in a position to be
accepted by a selective university, but it isn’t important to actually attend an elite
university. It does appear that some signaling effects from high resource schools do
benefit the players who choose to attend those institutions. The measurable premiums in
the college football labor market is small and marginal, which is in-line with the
signaling effect found with academic institutions, which tend to be short lived.
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